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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHESTER B. BRO,VN,
Appellant,
v.

~

JOHN l\T. TURNER, \Varden, (
U tab State Prison,
)
Respondent,

Case No.
11096

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEl\1EN'l' OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Chester B. Brown, appeals from an
order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,iVER COURT
By Order dated November 2, 1967, accompanied
by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, bearing
the same date, Honorable Bryant H. Croft denied
appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the order of the Third
District Court denying appellant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus should be affirmed.
STATEMENT

O~"'

FACTS

The respondent submits the following facts as being more in keeping with the rule that evidence on appeal will be reviewed in a light most favorable to the
trial court's determination.
On March 11, 1963, appellant was arraigned in the
Second Judicial District Court for the crime of issuing
a check against in~ufficient funds (R.51). At that
time, appellant was informed by the court that: ( 1)
It was a felony charge, ( 2) that conviction would mean
a penitentiary sentence, (3) that appellant was entitled
to be represented by an attorney, ( 4) that appellant
need do nothing further until he consulted with an attorney (R.55}. Having been so advised, appellant replied:
"I waive the attorney" (R.56).
Appellant admitted that he knew at the time the
court informed him of his right to counsel that if he
requested it the court would appoint him counsel
(R.79}. Appellant testified that he had obtained the
services of court appointed counsel at least twice previously, and as early as 1942 knew that he had a right
to court appointed counsel in felony cases (R.79). Evidence was further adduced that appellant knew the
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maximum term for the crime charged since he had just
finished serving a term of from zero to five years at the
Utah State Prison for the identical crime (R.69).
On April 28, 1966, appellant came before the Third
Judicial District Court for trial on charges of robbery
and grand larceny (R.84). Appellant was represented
by an able and competent criminal trial advocate who
was attempting to gain a dismissal of the robbery charge
and plead guilty to the grand larceny (R.95). At a
pretrial discussion, appellant not being present, appellant's counsel suggested a plea to the grand larceny
and counsel for the state was opposed (R.96). The
court felt that this procedure would be an equitable
result (T.96).
Appellant was then questioned in open court concerning a withdrawal of his earlier pleas of not guilty
to each count and a change to guilty on the grand larceny (R.86-88). Appellant testified that he did this
voluntarily:
Q. So you informed the Court you did this of
your own volition; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did it voluntarily.
A. Yes, sir. (R.87)
Appellant further testified that he knew that as
a result of his guilty plea that he would be returned
to the Utah State Prison for at least five years (R.88).
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Appellant's counsel was granted the convenience of
the record to specifically show the voluntariness of the
waiver by appellant of his right to a trial on the merits:
Q. Mr. Brown, you're aware you could have
a trial on this if you wanted, aren't you?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you' re waiving your right to be tried
on the robbery and the grand larceny and you're
willingly waiving right to trial on the grand larceny and the grand [sic} robbery to enter a plea
to grand larceny?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that's what you want to do?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have been advised by me about
the various penalties and what will happen?

A. Yes, sir. (R.88)
Appellant testified that no member of the judicial
system had made any promises to him concerning his
withdrawal of plea or his guilty plea (R.89).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY, KNO,VINGLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED
HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON THE 19(-13
4

CIIARGE O.F ISSUING A CHECK AGAINST
INSUFFICENT FUNDS.
For his first point on appeal, appellant attempts
to raise the hue and cry of "no counsel" as grounds for
reversing the determination of the trial court. Respondent would say only that the facts in the criminal proceeding as well as testimony adduced at hearing show
clearly that appellant made a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel in 1963.
Appellant was advised by the trial court at time
of arraignment:
The Court informs you emphatically that you
are entitled to be represented by an attorney,
if you desire to have the services of an attorney,
and you need not do anything further in this
matter - by way of plea or anything else until you have consulted an attorney, if it is your
desire to do so. (R.55)
Appellant testified at the hearing that he knew at
the time of this arraignment that if he desired court
appointed counsel, all he need do was to request it and
that the court would appoint counsel for him (R.79).
In State v. Spiers, 12 Utah 2d 14, 361 P.2d 509
(1961), this court stated at 12 Utah 2d 16:
The determining factor of whether appellant
was convicted without due process of law is
whether there has been an intelligent waiver of
his rights to counsel. This must depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, includ-
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ing the background, experience and conduct of
the accused. [Emphasis added.}
Here, the uncontradicted evidence shows ( 1) that
appellant had been in prison for thirty-four of his fiftyfive years (R. 59); (2) that he had been convicted of
at least ten felonies during that period ( R. 73-7 4) ; ( 3)
that he knew as early as 1942 that the court would appoint counsel on felony cases for him if he requested it
(R.79}.
During the course of the arraignment, the trial
court asked appellant three times if he wished an
attorney:
Q. You don't want an attorney?
A. I waive the attorney.

Q. Notwithstanding the fact that this is a
felony charge, and carries with it a penitentiary
sentence, you waive the services of an attorney
and although you're entitled to a jury trial, you
also waive that?
A. Yes.

Q. You waive the senices of an attorney?
A. Yes. (R.56)
In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1961), the
United States Supreme Court stated that the record
must show, or there must be allegation and evidence
which shows that the accused was offered counsel but
intelligently and understandingly rejected it. Respondent would submit that this requirement has been met
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by appellant's own testimony at trial. This admission
also negates the thrust of Dodge v. Turner, 27 4 1'"'.
Supp. 285 (D.C. Utah 1967), wherein the court held
"one cannot understandingly waive a right he does not
know he has." Appellant did know of his right to court
appointed counsel and waived it. See Hanks v. State,
18 Utah 2d 101, 417 P.2d 118 (1966).
Appellant further claims that he waived the assistance of counsel and plead guilty because of alleged
threats from police officers that if he did not do so, he
would be charged as an habitual criminal. It is to be
noted that appellant claims the identical threat as
grounds for reversing his 1966 plea ( R. 86) .
Appellant testified at the hearing that no officer
of the court of Weber County made any deal with him
nor did anyone connected with the court coerce him in
any way in his waiver of counsel or plea entry (R.81).
The only persons who allegedly talked to him in this
vein were men he identified as plainclothes officers of
the check detail ( R. 76). Appellant admitted that
neither man physically threatened him, only that they
had a bad reputation (R.77).
Respondent would submit that the uncorroborated
and unsupported testimony of petitioner is not sufficient to meet the standard of proof required to justify
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. McGuffey v.
Turner, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967). See
also Syddall v. Turner, ...... Utah 2d ...... , --···- P.2d
...... (January 30, 1968).
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A trial court is not required to believe the unsupported testimony of a habeas corpus petitioner even
though the respondent might not offer any evidence in
contradiction. Ex parte Farrell, 189 F.2d 540 (1st Cir.
1951).
The respondent submits that it is within the discretion of the judge who hears the petition for writ of
habeas corpus to grant or deny it. Unless there is a clear
abuse of this discretion, the decision of that court should
not be overturned. State v. Crank, 105 Utah 322, 142
P.2d 178 (1943).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FULLY COMPLIED
'VITH THE REQUIRElVIENTS OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-24-6 (1953) IN ADVISING
APPELLANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF
A PLEA OF GUILTY.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-6 (1953) provides:
'Vhere defendant is not represented by counsel, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty
unless it shall have explained to the defendant
the consequences of such a plea.
Appellant contends that this section requires that
a defendant be told of the maximum penalty that can
be imposed before the court can accept a guilty plea.
The leading Utah case construing the scope of the
term "consequence of plea" is State v. Ranford, 13 Utah

8

2d 63, 368 P .2d 473 ( 1962) . In that instance, the trial
court failed to inform Banford that a plea of guilty
would subject him to a term in the Utah State prison
and this court reversed the conviction on that basis.
In this matter the sentencing judge was the same
judge who erred in Ranford. He was, therefore, very
careful to comply with this court's ruling when advising
appellant:
Now the Court informs you, Mr. Brown, that
this is a felony charge and that it has with it a
penitentiary sentence. The Court further informs you that you are entitled to be tried by a
jury. . . . Notwithstanding the fact that this
is a felony charge and carries with it a penitentiary sentence you waive the services of an attorney; and although you're entitled to a jury trial,
you also waive that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. (R.55-56)
Respondent would submit that the trial court fully
complied with the spirit and the letter of Utah Code
Ann. § 77-24-6 (1953), as these are established in the
Banford case.
Appellant was not a novice before the court. He
had just recently been released from the Utah State
Prison after serving three years, eleven months and
fourteen days on the identical charge of issuing a check
againt insufficient funds (R.69). Appellant knew the
sentence for the crime charged. He had served at least
two terms for the identical crime and had been out of
prison only seven weeks when he committed the crime
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charged herein. Appellant admitted at the hearing that
he knew a plea of guilty would result in his incarceration at the Utah State Prison:
Q. Now, Mr. Brown, when you waived this
attorney, you in fact know that if you were
found guilty you would go to the state penitentiary; isn't that correct ?

A. Yes. (R.80)
Appellant voluntarily plead guilty to the charge
knowing such a plea would result in imprisonment. He
knew the consequences of that plea.

POINT III
THE APPELLANT ACTED VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WHEN HE WAIVED HIS RIGHT
TO JURY TRIAL AND ENTERED A PLEA
OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF GRAND
LARCENY IN 1966.
For the final point, appellant attempts to convince
this court that his waiver of a jury trial and his subsequent plea of guilty to a charge of grand larceny in
1966 was in some nebulous way affected by the trial
court and/ or by threats from Salt Lake City police
officers to charge appellant as an habitual criminal.
Respondent would submit that the trial court was
extremely careful to advise appellant of the conse-
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quences of a plea withdrawal and a subsequent entry
of a guilty plea:
THE COURT: .Mr. Brown, listen closely to
what the Court has to say and I want to be sure
you' re doing this of your own volition. It is
contemplated that your attorney has asked that
you be allowed to withdraw your former plea of
not guilty to each count and for you to enter a
plea, different plea to the count of grand larceny.
Now if this Court grants that motion and allows
you to do that and you do enter a different plea
to guilty to the crime of grand larceny you will
go back to the Utah State Penitentiary.
THE WITNESS: I automatically go back?
THE COURT: Yes, and you go back there
with the recommendation of this Court that you
serve at least five years on it. Do you understand?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. (R.87)
Counsel for appellant was scrupulous in showing
the basis and reason for appellant's plea to show its
voluntariness:
MR. O'CONNELL: Yes. Mr. Brown, you're
aware you could have a trial on this if you
wanted, aren't you?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
MR. O'CONNELL: And you're waivmg
your right to be tried on the robbery and the
grand larceny and you're willingly waiving right
to trial on the grand larceny and grand robbery
to enter a plea to grand larceny?
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THE 'VITNESS: Yes, sir.
lVIR. O'CONNELL: And you have Leen advised by me about the various penalties •1nd what
will happen?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. (R.88)
There was not one scintilla of evidence adduced at
the hearing to show that appellant was acting under
duress when he plead guilty (R.89). Appellant does
not state one fact that could be used as a basis for the
trier of fact to determine the plea to be coerced. He
attempts to show that appellant may have been influenced by the judge sitting in on a pretrial conference
where appellant's counsel raised the issue of a reduced
plea; that counsel may have told appellant that the
judge was in favor of it; that this knowledge could have
had some influence on appellant.
This court has pointed out numerous times that it
will not rely on suppositions as basis for reversing a
trial court determination. State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah
2d 234, 419 P.2d 770 (1966). Appellant was given
every opportunity at the hearing to present facts which
would support his claim of denial of constitutional
rights. He completely failed to off er any proof which
this court could find meets the "clear and convincing
preponderance of the evidence test" propounded in McGu ff ey, supra.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent would submit that appellant has totaily
failed to show any error committed by the trial court.
The grounds for reversal submitted by appellant are
wholly without merit. In all stages of the proceedings
against him, appellant was afforded full and complete
constitutional safeguards. The decision of the trial
court denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas
corpus should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
LEROY S. AXLAND
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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